Abstract: Bayesian Nash equilibrium is stable if observed information about the play gives no player an incentive to deviate from the play. Unstable equilibria lead to unpredictable chaotic behavior, for example: significant price fluctuations in market games, unsettled positions in location games and unpredictable driving patterns in driving games. The presentation illustrates sufficient conditions for stability in one-shot Bayesian games and the type of stability that is obtained due to learning in Bayesian repeated games.

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